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May Class Counsel Also Represent Lead Plaintiffs?
Bruce A. Green & Andrew Kent*
Forthcoming in the Florida Law Review
ABSTRACT
For decades, courts and commentators have been aware that the potential
for conflicting interests among the class representatives, class counsel, and
absent class members is inherent in the class action device. Notwithstanding
this realization and a substantial amount of scholarly and judicial
commentary on class conflicts, one kind of conflict has not received due
attention: the conflict that inevitably arises when class counsel also
represents class members as individuals. We demonstrate that this conflict—
so common to be almost invisible—arises from the very beginning of a
putative class representation, and may create a fraught situation for a lawyer
concurrently representing both the class (or putative class) and the class
representative individually. We examine three situations in which these
conflicts are most acute: holdouts (where the class representative holds out
against a settlement that would benefit the class as a whole), sellouts (where
the class representative could benefit personally by settling individual claims
only), and payouts (where the class representative could use class action
procedures to benefit personally at the expense of the class). We canvas
potential solutions and conclude that radical ones—for instance, banning
concurrent representation of a class and a class member individually—would
do more harm than good. We therefore recommend more measured
responses, primarily (1) greater disclosure of risks to individual clients by
their attorneys, (2) greater judicial oversight, and (3) an amendment to Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or its advisory committee notes,
calling on courts to police the types of conflict we identify.
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INTRODUCTION
An attorney seeking to represent a class ordinarily begins by
representing one or more plaintiffs individually.1 The clients may be
1 See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 19:2 (5th ed. 2011-19) [hereinafter NEWBERG] (“[A]n attorney seeking to
represent, or representing, a class will almost certainly have an attorney-client
relationship with the class representatives . . . If the class is certified, the individual client
likely becomes the class representative and remains a client for all purposes.”). Similarly,
formation of an individual attorney-client relationship is common when preparing to seek
appointment as a lead plaintiff-class counsel tandem in a class action already filed by
someone else. This occurs frequently in putative securities class actions, where the
relevant statute makes clear that a class member who has not filed a complaint may be
appointed to be the lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(i).

For examples of retainer agreements which provide for an individual representation
first, followed by an attempt to obtain class certification and add the class as a client, see
Retainer Agreement—Class Action, ECF No. 84-2, BABB Real Estate LLC v. Bennett Shelaine,
No. 3:10-cv-00119 (W.D. Wisc.); Retainer Agreement for Legal Services, ECF No. 57-1,
Lopez v. Delta Airlines Inc., No. 2:16-cv-04497 (C.D. Cal.); Schoengold & Sporn, P.C. Letter
of Engagement, https://www.spornlaw.com/class_action.php; Shepherd Finkelman Miller
& Shah LLP, Retainer Agreement, http://www.hallandalebeachfl.gov/files/2012-05-
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institutional investors who have potential securities law claims, or
individuals with potential consumer law, employment, or civil rights claims,
among others.2 The practice raises important questions about conflicts of
interest. Courts, class actions lawyers, and commentators have not
sufficiently appreciated the problem.
Before filing a class action, the lawyer owes ethical and fiduciary
duties—for instance, loyalty, competence and confidentiality—exclusively
to the clients individually. Even after the lawyer files a class action
complaint on behalf of the client, or files a motion for appointment of lead
plaintiff and lead counsel in an already-filed action, the lawyer presumably
must represent the client individually at least until the court certifies the
class, because, until then, the named plaintiff, not the class—which does not
yet exist—is the party to the lawsuit. Throughout this time, the individual
client may seek counsel’s disinterested legal advice, first, about whether to
bring an individual claim or a class action, and whether to apply to serve as
a lead plaintiff in a class action, and later, about whether to seek a
settlement, and other issues.
Case law, the professional literature, and publicly available retainer
agreements3 indicate that as a class action lawsuit progresses, lawyers for
the class customarily continue their individual representations.4 There is
no evidence that the lawyers, perceiving that they have a conflict of interest,
02/Item%209C/SUPP_DOCS/Documents/Doc2.rtf.
2 Professor Fitzpatrick’s study of all federal court class actions settled in a two-year
period (2006 and 2007) found that the most common kinds of class actions were securities
cases (37%), labor and employment (14%), consumer (13%), employee benefits (9%),
civil rights (9%), debt collection (6%), antitrust (4%), and commercial (2%). See Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 811, 818 (2010).

Although we have not conducted a systematic study, we have reviewed several dozen
retainer agreements that are publicly-available on PACER, the websites of class action law
firms, and websites devoted to settlements in particular class actions. We limited ourselves
to class action litigation in federal courts, and sought agreements from a variety of kinds
of class actions. We found no agreements which discussed ending the individual client
relationship after class certification. Many of the agreements we reviewed are cited
throughout this article.
3

An individual representation alongside a class representation is more likely to occur
where the litigation could have a more than nominal value to an individual plaintiff. See,
e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1147,
1497-98. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 388 (2000) (discussing a mass
tort action with both individual and class representation by the same lawyers).
4
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commonly seek the informed consent of their individual clients or the
approval of the court to the joint representation of both the class and lead
plaintiffs as individual claimants.5
In a class action in federal court, district court judges principally
address a lawyer’s conflicts of interest at two stages. First, in deciding
which lawyer to appoint as class counsel, and whether that lawyer can
“fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,”6 courts may
consider whether the loyalty and competence of the lawyer would be
compromised by the lawyer’s duties to other current or former clients or
by the lawyer’s own competing interests.7 Second, in determining the
fairness of proposed settlements,8 which are far more common than trials,9
judges may consider whether class counsel’s negotiations or decisions were
compromised by a conflict of interest.10 (Sometimes courts address
5 We have seen the occasional retainer agreement that hints at the issue. See, e.g.,
Authority to Represent and Retainer Agreement for Class Action Lawsuit, ECF No. 84-2, In
re Ocean Fin. Corp. Prescreening Litig., No. 06-C-3515 (N.D. Ill.) (“I understand that if My
Attorneys are approved as class counsel, they may owe duties and responsibilities to all
members of the class, rather than to me alone. I hereby consent to My Attorneys acting as
class counsel if the court so designates them.”).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4). Before subsection (g) was added in 2003 specifically
addressing the appointment of class counsel, “courts . . . scrutinized proposed class counsel
. . . under Rule 23(a)(4),” Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments to Rule 23, Fed. R.
Civ. P., which requires that “the representative parties” be able and likely to “fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” See also Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (stating that the adequacy of representation inquiry involves
looking at the “competency and conflicts of class counsel”).

See, e.g., Winiger v. SI Management L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
question of whether there is an ethical conflict forms part of the class certification
question.”).
7

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal [for settlement] would bind class
members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair,
reasonable, and adequate after considering whether: (A) the class representatives and
class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at
arm’s length . . . .”).
8

9 Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 812 (“[V]irtually all cases certified as class actions and not

dismissed before trial end in settlement”).
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856-57 (1999) (reversing approval
of a class action settlement because, among other reasons, class counsel represented
groups with conflicting interests); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 356 F.2d 781, 785 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“Because class actions are rife with potential conflicts of interest between class
counsel and class members, . . . district judges presiding over such actions are expected to
give careful scrutiny to the terms of proposed settlements in order to make sure that class
counsel are behaving as honest fiduciaries for the class as a whole.”) (citations omitted).
10
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conflicts at other procedural stages, for instance, in determining the amount
of attorneys’ fees to be awarded.) There is a substantial literature on
conflicts of interest in class actions.11 But courts, class action lawyers, and
commentators have not analyzed, and rarely even acknowledge, a conflict
of interest that is ubiquitous in class actions—namely, the conflict of
interest that inheres when counsel for a class concurrently represents class
representatives as individual clients.12
Lawyers may assume that they can continue to represent class
representatives throughout the lawsuit because the interests of the class
representatives are largely aligned with those of the class. To certify a class,
the court will have to determine that these proposed class representatives
are “members” of the class, have claims “typical” of the class, and will “fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”13 Moreover, the class
representatives agree to assume fiduciary duties to the class.14 But, in fact,
On intra-class conflicts, that is, on the differing interests of different members of the
class see, for example, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Samuel Issacharoff,
Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of
Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 581; Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
For a discussion of the conflict between the class counsel’s financial interests and the
class’s interests, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987);
Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions:
Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2000); Benjamin R. Edwards &
Anthony Rickey, Uncovering the Hidden Conflicts in Securities Class Action Litigation:
Lessons from the State Street Case, BUSINESS LAWYER (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3364470. For a discussion of the
conflict when one lawyer represents different classes in different actions against the same
defendant, see Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: The Conflict
of Interest Problem in Sibling Class Actions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1195 (2008).
11

For acknowledgements of this problem, see Moore, supra note 4, at 1489, 1497-98,
1500-01; Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 393, 396, 398-99 (1987); Developments in the Law‐Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1446-54 (1981). For a summary
rejection of the suggestion that a conflict could be posed for class counsel by also
representing an absent class member individually, see Borum v. Brentwood Village LLC,
No. 16-1723, 2019 WL 2437686, at *11 (D.D.C. June 11, 2019).
12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). On the standards governing the adequacy of class
representatives, see, e.g., Amchem Products, 521 U.S. at 624-26 & n.20; Debra Lyn Bassett,
When Reform is Not Enough: Assuring More Than Merely ‘Adequate’ Representation in Class
Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 965 (2004).
13

See, e.g., In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating
that named plaintiffs have “fiduciary duties to the class”); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,
14
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the class representatives’ interests may diverge from those of the class,
either because the individuals’ interests are not perfectly aligned with those
of the class as a whole,15 or because the class action procedure enables them
to benefit financially at the class’s expense.16 Notwithstanding their
fiduciary undertaking, representative plaintiffs may act in their own selfinterest.17 Courts know this, because published decisions describe
situations where class counsel could not competently and loyally represent
both the class and a self-interested class representative.18 But courts do not
require class counsel to avoid this risk by withdrawing from the
representation of individual class members when the class is certified. Nor
would that entirely solve the problem, since lawyers are expected to act in
the interest of the putative class even prior to class certification, as
described below.
This article explores the problem of conflicts arising from class
counsel’s concurrent representation of a class and individual
representative plaintiffs.19 We analyze lawyers’ duties and conflicts from
the perspective of both federal court case law and the ethics rules adopted
throughout the United States based on the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.20 We acknowledge that ethics
404 F.3d 173, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he lead plaintiff serves as a fiduciary for the entire
class.”); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1305 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that from the
time a class complaint is filed, class representatives have “a fiduciary obligation towards
the members of the putative class they thus have undertaken to represent”).
15 See, e.g., 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:7 (“Counsel in a class action lawsuit represents

both one or more individual clients (as class representatives) and a large group of absent
class members. It is somewhat inevitable that there will be fissures within such a large
group of litigants.”); Miller, supra note 11, at 581 (observing that “[c]onflicts of interest
pervade class action litigation” in part because of “the potential for members of the class
to be differently situated”); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.14 at 492 (1986)
(“Conflict is rife within the structure of the class itself. Most obviously, the class
representative may have interests and goals that in fact are not shared by represented by
absent class members.”).
16

See Part II, infra.

17 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137,
1151 (2009) (describing the “indifference” to the class’s interests of “class representatives
. . . who are willing to represent the interests of class members only to the extent that such
representations serve their own interests”).
18

See Part I, infra.

19 The same issues may arise when class counsel also represents an absent class
member as an individual client. However, we focus on the representation of lead plaintiffs.
20

Rules

See American Bar Association, Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model
(last
updated
March
28,
2018),
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rules expressly address class actions only sporadically and provide little
specific guidance.21 Further, as discussed below, some courts and
commentators believe in disregarding ethics rules when they conflict with
the goals and policies of class actions.22 Nevertheless, exploring the
conflicts in class actions through the lens of conflict-of-interest rules23 and
doctrine is illumining, because the rules encapsulate widely-shared, longpersisting views about conflicts that are deeply influential.24 And the
conflict rules govern all lawyers, including plaintiff-side class action
lawyers. Even if the rules might be a poor fit for a class representation—a
possibility we address below—the rules and the client interests they
protect are indisputably relevant to assessing how class action lawyers are
treating their individual clients. The rules’ framework provides a valuable
benchmark against which to measure how well class action decisional law
addresses the conflicts we discuss here. Although we support federal
courts’ current approach of addressing conflicts primarily via case-by-case
adjudication, highlighting how and where current case law has departed
from the rules helps ground our suggestions for reforming case law.
Ethics rules recognize that lawyers have a “concurrent conflict of
interest” if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client.”25 The conflict can be waived if the affected clients give informed
consent in writing and the lawyer “reasonably believes” that he or she “will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client.”26 Federal courts addressing conflicts issues in class actions often
acknowledge this standard but freely adopt their own approach when they
disagree with what the Rules seem to require. Federal courts and
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_
rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/.
California
adopted new rules based on the ABA Model Rules effective in November 2018. See The
State Bar of California, New Rules of Professional Conduct Effective November 1,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/News-Events/News-Releases/new-rules-ofprofessional-conduct-effective-november-1.
21

See, e.g., Moore, supra note 4, at 1478.

22

See infra note 68 and accompanying text.

23

See generally Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

24 See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 71, 99 (1996) (“The conflict rules, promulgated by courts based on the ABA models,
are rooted in common law principles that are more than a century old.”).
25

Rule 1.7(a), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

26

Id., Rule 1.7(b).
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commentators frequently suggest that conflicts rules cannot be
“mechanically” applied to the class action setting,27 and that if ethics rules
conflict with the needs of making class actions viable, the ethics rules must
be softened or give way entirely.28 For example, courts often do not
disqualify class counsel who have what would ordinarily be a disabling
conflict of interest.29 This article illuminates what is lost when the Model
Rules framework for conflicts is ignored or relaxed in class action practice.
The article begins by exploring the magnitude of the overlooked
problem. Because a lawyer’s duties with regard to conflicts can defined and
analyzed by reference to identified clients, Part I of this article provides
necessary background by discussing the surprisingly unresolved question
of who are the clients of class counsel at various stages of litigation. Part I
sets out the standard view among courts and commentators about how
class representatives and absent class members should be protected from
conflicts. Part II then describes three recurring situations where the
respective interests of a class and the class representatives may diverge, at
times dramatically, with the result that one lawyer could not loyally and
competently serve both the class and its representative. Part III considers
whether the joint representation constitutes a conflict of interest even
before a class representative begins acting to the class’s detriment. First, it
discusses whether the conflict of interest exists at the time of class
certification, because, looking ahead, there is a significant risk that the class
representative will act self-interestedly. Second, it considers whether
lawyers have a conflict of interest even earlier, upon filing the class action,
when lawyers first assume fiduciary duties to absent class members or to
the nascent class.
The article then considers the implications of the initial analysis for
plaintiffs’ lawyers, rulemakers and trial courts. Part IV argues that before
lawyers file a class action, they must explain how the class action will limit
See, e.g., In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 102 (2d Cir.
2003) (“[T]he traditional rules concerning conflict-free representation, applicable in nonclass suits, ‘should not be mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the settlement
of class action litigation.’”) (quoting Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 19); 6 NEWBERG, supra note
1, § 19:1 (“Class action practice has a peculiar relationship to legal ethics. . . . [C]ourts
cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules developed in the traditional
lawyer-client setting context.”).
27

28

See infra note 68 and accompanying text.

29 See, e.g., Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988)
(declining to disqualify former class counsel from presenting an unnamed class member’s
challenge to a settlement, finding the conflict of interest was not sufficiently “serious”).
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their ability to act and give advice for the individual’s benefit, and how they
will respond if a conflict of interest later precludes serving both the client
and the class. This Part demonstrates the inadequacy of courts’ and
commentators’ standard approach—namely, that class counsel will give
primary loyalty to the class as a whole, and that the district court will
monitor for and resolve conflicts when they become overt.
Part V suggests that federal rulemakers should amend Rule 23 to
clarify that class counsel’s conflicts should be addressed by the courts.
Fearing that such an amendment may be unlikely, the remainder of Part V
addresses courts’ responsibility to protect the class under existing law. It
asks whether trial judges have a responsibility under Rule 23 to forbid, or
impose conditions on, a lawyer’s joint representation of an individual class
representative and the class or nascent class. This Part also discusses the
implications of this dilemma for courts exercising their responsibility for
interpreting both professional conduct rules and civil procedure rules as
well as their responsibility for supervising class actions and class counsel
to protect the interests of the class and ensure lawyers’ compliance with
professional expectations. Among other things, we conclude that courts
should clarify the applicability of conflict rules; and they should clarify class
counsel’s responsibilities to the class vis-à-vis class representatives at
different stages of the lawsuit.
In undertaking this inquiry, we focus on practice in federal courts,
where most class actions are filed.30 Although our analysis may also apply
to collective actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we
exclude such suits from our coverage here. Both class actions and FLSA
collective actions involve lead plaintiffs and lead counsel controlling a suit
on behalf of other similarly-situated plaintiffs; however, the FLSA expressly
provides that all aggregated plaintiffs have the status of formal parties.31
There are thus no “absent” class members in a formal sense in FLSA
litigation. Nor do we address non-class aggregate litigation,32 although
See Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 843 (2017) (observing that
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 “has successfully shifted much class practice to
federal court.”) (citing Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1593, 1607-14 (2008)).
30

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d
215, 225 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing this difference between Rule 23 class actions and FLSA
collective actions).
31

As it has become harder to certify mass tort cases as class actions, aggregation of
those cases has increasingly occurred through the multi-district litigation (MDL)
procedures in federal court. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The
32
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multi-strict litigation (MDL) aggregation has much in common with class
action representation.33 Our analysis may have broader implications, but
federal class actions afford a significant enough area on which to focus
initially.
I. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE: WHO IS THE CLIENT AND HOW SHOULD CLASS
CONFLICTS BE ADDRESSED?
Even after decades of litigation under Rule 23,34 basic but crucial
questions remain uncertain: Who or what are the clients of the class action
lawyer? At what stage do client or client-like relationships begin? What
duties and responsibilities do class counsel have? What rights and
responsibilities do clients have? Can ethics rules (based on the ABA Model
Rules) about client identity, conflicts of interest, and other topics, written
for non-class actions, be applied to class actions also, or must ethics rules
be ignored or modified in the class action context?
A. The Unresolved Problem of Identifying the Clients
Before filing a class action or seeking appointment as lead counsel in
a putative class action filed by another, a lawyer ordinarily establishes a
lawyer-client relationship in the matter with one or more members of the
prospective class.35 The lawyer’s ethical and fiduciary duties of loyalty,
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 833 (2017); William B.
Rubenstein, Procedure and Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136,
144 n.40 (2013). Mass tort cases aggregated via MDL differ in relevant respects from the
class actions we address here: All plaintiffs individually retain lawyers and negotiate
individual contracts with them, and those representations continue as both a formal and
practical matter throughout the litigation. See, e.g., Morris Ratner, Achieving Procedural
Goals through Indirection: The Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL
Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 59, 64 (2013).
For instance, the court appoints a small subset of plaintiffs’ lawyers as lead counsel
to perform common benefit work for all plaintiffs, see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Quasi‐Class Action Method of Managing Multi‐District Litigations: Problems and A
Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 118 (2010), and the lawyers operate largely autonomously
from client control, see Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in
Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011).
33

The modern version of the class action rule (Rule 23) was adopted in 1966. See
Advisory Comm. Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23. Use of the class action device
increased substantially after these amendments. See generally Scott Dodson, A Negative
Retrospective of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 921 (2017).
34

Some lawyers specify that the relationship extends only to deciding whether to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff and class counsel, and litigating any class certification motion
35
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competence, and confidentiality belong exclusively to the individual client.
The clarity of the lawyer’s role ends here, however.
After filing the class action complaint but prior to certification,
counsel has no “formal” attorney-client relationship with the putative
class,36 but according to case law and official commentary on Rule 23,
“generally must act in the class’s best interests.”37 Interim counsel for a
putative class may be, but need not be, formally designated by the district
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3). Commentary on the Model Rules states
that a lawyer seeking to represent a class is not “ordinarily” considered to
have a lawyer-client relationship with putative absent class members for
purposes of the principal rule on concurrent conflicts of interest, Rule
1.7(a).38
After a class is certified and a lawyer is appointed to serve as class
counsel, the lawyer owes the class most—but not all—of the ethical and
fiduciary duties of loyalty that lawyers ordinarily owe to clients. Class
counsel are said to be fiduciaries for the class as a whole.39 This means that
that the lawyer determines to file, and that the representation will end if the lawyer
decides not to proceed or the judge denies appointment. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel H.
Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, to Geoffrey D. Flagstad, ECF No. 80-14, City
of Cape Coral Municipal Firefighters’ Retirement Plan v. Emergent Biosolutions, Inc., No.
8:16-cv-02624 (D. Md.) (“If the court does not certify the case as a class action, we will
discuss representing you on a limited basis.”).
36 See, e.g., ABA Formal Ethics Op. 07-445 (“A lawyer-client relationship with a potential
member of the class does not begin until the class has been certified and the time for opting
out by a potential member of the class has expired.”).
37 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:2. See also Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments
to Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Whether or not formally designed interim counsel, an attorney
who acts on behalf of the class prior to certification must act in the best interests of the
class as a whole.”).
38 The rule provides that: “(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Rule 1.7, ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]lass
counsel’s fiduciary duty is to the class as a whole.”); In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799
F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that class counsel have “fiduciary duties to the
class”); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Keepseagle
v. Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (same). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4)
(“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”); 6
39
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class counsel may not serve their own interests, or someone else’s interests,
such as those of a different client, to the detriment of the class.40 In deciding
whether to appoint a particular lawyer to serve as class counsel, courts are
supposed to look closely at allegations that the lawyer in question owes
duties to others or has personal interests that will compromise the lawyer’s
ability to give undivided loyalty to the class.41
Importantly, class counsel’s duty of loyalty is to the entire class, not
to any particular class member.42 Most courts and commentators believe
that class counsel has a primary duty to the class and only a secondary duty
to individual class members, even if there exists an attorney-client
agreement to press individual claims in addition to class claims. The
Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, which
added subsection (g) concerning appointment of class counsel, state that:
“[T]he primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from
appointment as class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the
class. The rule thus establishes the obligation of class counsel, an
obligation that may be different from the customary obligations of
counsel to individual clients.”
This commentary apparently arose from debates about whether to adopt
an “entity theory” of the class, under which the role of class representatives
would decline or perhaps be eliminated.43

NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:20 (“The class counsel-class representative relationship
within the class action is treated as an attorney-client relationship.”).
See, e.g., Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 934, 938–39 (8th Cir. 1995)
(stating that “certified representatives and the class counsel assume[ ] certain fiduciary
responsibilities to the Class,” and as a result, “the certified representatives may not take
any action which will prejudice the Class's interest, or further their personal interests at
the expense of the Class”).
40

See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab.
Litig., 895 F.3d 597, 607-08 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale
Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 36 & n.12 (1st Cir. 2009); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)
§ 21.271 at 279 (2004).
41

See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161, 1167
(9th Cir. 2013) (“Class counsel has a fiduciary duty to the class as a whole.”); Agent Orange,
800 F.2d at 18 (“[T]he class attorney’s duty does not run just to the plaintiff's named in the
caption of the case; it runs to all of the members of the class”).
42

43 See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548872

GREEN & KENT

13

A leading civil procedure treatise goes further than the Advisory
Committee Notes in sidelining the individual in favor of the “class as a
whole”:
“The appointed class counsel represents the interests of the class as
a whole, however, not the interest of the class representatives, and
must be guided accordingly. . . . [A] formal court appointment as
class counsel will inevitably shift the attorney’s allegiance from the
attorney’s former client (the named plaintiffs) to the attorney’s new
client (the class).”44
This treatise goes too far in suggesting that the lead plaintiffs have
become “former” clients of class counsel. Most lawyers, courts, and
commentators view the individual lawyer-client relationship with named
plaintiffs as continuing, albeit in modified form.45 Retainer agreements we
have reviewed suggest that the attorney-client relationship formed prior to
class certification generally is understood to continue.46 But the treatise
does capture the common view that after certification the primary loyalty
of the class counsel is to the class as a whole, which must be preferred over
lead plaintiffs, whether or not they are also individual clients,47 and over
13, 26-327 (1996)
44

5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][i] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4)).

45 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Beyond their ethical obligations to their clients, class attorneys,
purporting to represent a class, also owe the entire class a fiduciary duty once the class
complaint is filed.”); In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“[T]he class attorney’s duty does not run just to the plaintiffs named in the caption of the
case; it runs to all of the members of the class.”); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:2 (“[A]n
attorney seeking to represent, or representing, a class will almost certainly have an
attorney-client relationship with the class representatives . . . If the class is certified, the
individual client likely becomes the class representative and remains a client for all
purposes.”).

See, e.g., Retainer Agreement—Class Action, ECF No. 137-34, Savanna Group, Inc. v.
Trynex, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-07995 (N.D. Ill.); Authorization, ECF No. 16-5, Pronesti v. Acument
Global Tech., Inc., No. 2:08-cv-15086 (E.D. Mich.); Letter to Clemens Gaebal, Union Asset
Mgmt. Holding AG, from William Narwold, Motley Rice (Nov. 7, 2006), ECF No. 242-4, In re
Dell Inc. Securities Litig., No. 1:06-cv-00726 (W.D. Tex.).
46

See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir.
1995) (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978))
(“The attorneys themselves have an obligation to all of the class members, and ‘when a
potential conflict arises between the named plaintiffs and the rest of the class, the class
attorney must not allow decisions on behalf of the class to rest exclusively with the named
plaintiffs.’”); Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983)
47
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absent class members.
This “solution” would fail in a regular setting of an attorney with two
concurrent clients with conflicting interests. Under the Model Rules, a
lawyer who undertakes a joint representation may not favor one co-client
over another: doing so would be the very definition of a conflict of interest.
Although class counsel has something akin to an attorney-client
relationship with those appointed by the court to serve as class
representatives48—for example, class counsel must consult with class
representatives49—this is not an ordinary attorney-client relationship. The
(“Class counsel’s duty to the class as a whole frequently diverges from the opinion of either
the named plaintiff or other objectors.”); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:25 (stating that,
when a class representative and individual client becomes an objector to class action
settlement, “class action law unambiguously places upon class counsel a duty to act in the
class’s best interest”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(iii)
(stating that, in case of serious differences within class or between class representatives
and absent class members, “the lawyer may proceed in what the lawyer reasonably
concludes to be the best interests of the of the class as a whole”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.641 at 323 (2004) (“Class counsel must discuss with the class
representatives the terms of any settlement offered to the class. Approval or rejection of
the offer by the representatives, however, does not end the attorneys’ obligations, because
they must act in the best interests of the class as a whole.”).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (“Class actions may
pose difficult questions of client identification. For many purposes, the named class
representatives are the clients of the lawyer for the class.”). See also 6 NEWBERG, supra note
1, § 19:2 (“[R]egardless of whether the class representative was initially an individual
client of class counsel, once a court certifies a class and appoints class representatives and
class counsel, those parties have an attorney-client relationship with one another.”); id. §
19:2 (“[O]nce a class has been certified, the default presumption is that there is an
attorney-client relationship between class counsel and the absent class members.”).
48

49 See, e.g., Doe v. Briley, No. 3:73-CV-6971, 2016 WL 6125437, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Oct.
20, 2016) (stating that class counsel violated ethical rules requiring consultation with
clients when negotiated on behalf of class without consulting or even knowing how to
contact lead plaintiff); Byes v. Telecheck Recovery Services, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 421, 427-29
(E.D. La. 1997) (finding putative class counsel inadequate because, among other reasons,
he did not convey information to the class representative about settlement offers). Cf.
Olden v. Gardner, 294 F. App’x 210, 220 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Class representatives are
expected to protect the interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This requires that
the class representatives exercise some oversight of the class counsel so as to avoid simply
turning the conduct of the case over to the class counsel.”); Twelve John Does v. D.C., 117
F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding proposed class representatives adequate in part
because of good “communication between class counsel and the class”). But see Banyai v.
Mazur, No. 00-Civ-9806, 2004 WL 1948755, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004) (rejecting motion
to replace class counsel and stating that it was not inappropriate for counsel to exclude
class representatives from settlement negotiations).
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class action lawyer does not take direction from the named plaintiffs, as a
lawyer would from a client.50
“[A] class representative may not
singlehandedly veto a proposed settlement,”51 while under the Model
Rules, a client has an absolute right to reject any proposed settlement.52
Under standard agency law principles, a client has the near-absolute right
to access the lawyer’s files about her case. But class representatives
generally do not have any unfettered right to access.53 In a standard
attorney-client representation, the client has the absolute right to fire her
lawyer for any reason at any time; the only qualification is that, if litigation
has been filed, the client’s discharge of counsel is subject to court
approval.54 But a class representative has no right to “replace class counsel
at will.”55 In the typical lawyer-client relationship, the client and lawyer
privately negotiate a fee, subject to only extremely loose regulation under
disciplinary rules.56 In a class action, the court sets class counsel’s fee.57
50 Class counsel have been called “clientless” lawyers to capture the idea that the lawyer
does not take direction from anyone – neither from an individual client nor from a legally
authorized representative of a client. See Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. 109-14 (2005), at 32 (stating the class actions “often
involve numerous plaintiffs, each of whom has only a small financial stake in the litigation.
As a result, few (if any) plaintiffs closely monitor the progress of the case or settlement
negotiations, and these cases become ‘clientless litigation’”); Russell M. Gold, “Clientless”
Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 111 (2017) (“[T]he lawyer, rather than the client, has to make
the critical decisions in ‘clientless’ litigation.”). See generally Cooper, supra note 23, at 27
(”A familiar concern is that class counsel in fact are the class”); Coffee, supra note 4, at 384
(“the class representative is usually a token figure, with the class counsel being the real
party in interest.”).

Hayes v. Harmony Gold Min. Co., 509 F. App’x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2013). Accord In re Ivan
F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1366 (2d Cir. 1991); In re FedEx Ground Package
Systems, Inc. Employment Practices Litig., 2017 WL 632119, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 2017); 5
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][ii]. In one case, a court approved a
settlement despite objections from ten out of the eleven class representatives. See Parker
v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. 1982).
51

52 See Rules 1.2(a) & 1.8(g), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Kincade
v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the ordinary
rule that an attorney cannot settle without approval of the client is “simply inapplicable . .
. [b]ecause of the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship in a class action”).
53

See Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 400 (2009).

54

See Rule 1.16(a)(3) and (c), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995). See
also 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][i].
55

See Rule 1.5(a), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall not make
an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee.”).
57 See Rule 23(h), Fed. R. Civ. P. See also Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class
Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1943 (2011) (“The law does not allow class members to
56
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Unlike in an ordinary representation, class counsel is not obligated, or even
permitted, to loyally and competently pursue the individual class
representative’s interests as distinct from those of the class members
collectively.58 Rather, the lawyer is responsible to do what is in the class’s
best interest, which may at times be contrary to the named plaintiffs’
preferences.
Absent class members’ relationship with class counsel is even less
like a lawyer-client relationship. Clients ordinarily decide whether or not
to sue. But class counsel initiates class actions and seeks certification
without the knowledge or approval of absent class members. Many will
never have any communication with counsel, or even know the litigation
exists, until receiving an opt-out notice or settlement notice. Like class
representatives, absent class members lack standard client rights like the
ability to veto a settlement. The commentary to the Model Rules recognizes
that because “unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered
to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying” the conflict-of-interest
rule,59 class counsel may sue an absent class member in an unrelated
matter.60 Federal courts and commentary on class action practice agree.61
The notion that class counsel’s primary duty is to an abstractsounding entity—the class “as a whole”—rather than to individuals, has led
some commentators to look for analogies. Many compare the class to a
single entity like a corporation.62 But class counsel’s role differs from that
of a corporation’s lawyer.63 Corporate lawyers take direction from duly
authorized corporate officers,64 whereas class counsel makes decisions for
choose their attorney, to fire her, or to determine her compensation.”).
58 See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1325 (2d Cir.
1990); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1982).
59

Comment 25 to Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct

60

Id.

61 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:2 (“[C]ourts and commentators have held that absent
class members, even after class certification, are not clients for some conflicts purposes,
meaning that class counsel may be adverse to absent class members in other matters
unrelated to the class action.”).
62 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 913, 917 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
699, 704 (2013); Lahav, supra note 57, at 1946.
63 See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 577, 578 (2012); Moore, supra note 4, at 1482-89.
64

See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
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the class. Likewise, class counsel’s role differs from that of a lawyer
representing a fiduciary such as an administrator of an estate, a courtappointed guardian, or a trustee.65 A fiduciary’s lawyer takes directions
from the fiduciary.66 The lawyer owes obligations derivatively to the
beneficiary in some circumstances,67 and may have some responsibility to
protect the beneficiary from the fiduciary’s overreaching, but the fiduciary
as client still has a wide range of discretion in making decisions regarding
the representation. In contrast, in a class action, the lawyer, not the class
representative, makes decisions on behalf of the class. Consequently, a
lawyer who represented only the class could not properly endeavor to
serve the interests of a class representative at the class’s expense.
B. The Standard View of Handling Conflicts in Class Action Practice
Case law and leading commentary reflect a standard four-part
approach to conflicts in class actions. Although courts and commentators
only rarely acknowledge the conflict we address here, the federal judiciary
and leading commentators probably assume that this approach sufficiently
addresses all of class counsel’s conflicts, including any conflict in jointly
representing a class and a class representative as an individual.
First, to the extent that applying ethics rules would appear to make
class actions less useful or more complex, courts often state that traditional
conflicts rules should be relaxed or ignored.68 Second, as noted, in resolving
(1985) (“As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation
cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when
disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by
individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation.”); Rule 1.13(a), ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”).
Some commentators have pressed the trustee analogy. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish &
Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class Certification
and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1662 (2014); Sergio J.
Campos, Class Actions & Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 565 (2014).
65

Cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5021 (“[O]nly the person or entity acting as a fiduciary is
considered a client of the lawyer.”); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 94–380 (1994) (“The majority of jurisdictions consider that a lawyer who represents
a fiduciary does not also represent the beneficiaries, and we understand the Model Rules
to reflect this majority view.”).
66

67 See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1969) (“An attorney who negligently
fails to fulfill a client’s testamentary directions incurs liability in tort for violating a duty of
care owed directly to the intended beneficiaries.”).
68

See, e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589-90 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
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conflicts issues, courts prefer the class “as a whole” over the individual.69
Third, the district court must act as a “fiduciary” for absent class
members to protect their best interests.70 As the Federal Judicial Center has
said, “Unlike other civil litigation, many class action suits do not involve a
client who chooses a lawyer, negotiates the terms of the engagement, and
monitor’s the lawyer’s performance. Those tasks, by default, fall to the
judge.”71 The notion of a judge as a fiduciary protecting the interests of one
side of a contested litigation is, of course, inconsistent with the standard
view of our adversary system.72

courts do not apply disqualification rules automatically in class actions, because automatic
disqualification “would have a serious adverse effect on class actions”); In re Agent Orange
Prods. Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) (reviewing ordinary ethics rules and
suggesting that “[c]lass action litigation presents additional problems that must be
considered in determining whether or not to disqualify an attorney”); Bash v. Firstmark
Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Recognizing that strict
application of rules on attorney conduct that were designed with simpler litigation in mind
might make the class-action device unworkable in many cases, the courts insist that a
serious conflict be shown before they will take remedial or disciplinary action.”); In re Corn
Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring)
(stating that the “traditional” lawyer ethics “model cannot be carried over unmodified to
the class action arena”); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:25 (“If the normal rule requiring
disqualification applied, class actions would be nearly impossible to pursue, and hence the
values served by such suits would be compromised.”). Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89, 101-03 (1981) (overturning district court order barring solicitation or other
communications by putative class counsel with class members on the ground that it
interfered with Rule 23 goals for class actions).
69

See supra notes 39, 44, 47 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys.,
814 F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.,
563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir.
2010); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 225 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
Wireless Tel. Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005); In re
Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 345 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D. Mass. 2004); Ray v.
Mechel Bluestone, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-03014, 2018 WL 1309731, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 13,
2018); Jackson v. Innovative Sec. Servs., LLC, 283 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2012); 4 NEWBERG,
supra note 1, § 13:40.
70

71

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.27 at 278 (2004).

A fiduciary must act in the best interests of the client or beneficiary. See, e.g., BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 523 (7th ed.1999) (“fiduciary duty” defined in part as “a duty to act with
the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests
of the other person”). But it violates the Due Process Clause for a judge to be actually biased
or appear to be biased in favor of one party over another. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey
72
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Fourth and finally, courts emphasize that class counsel has a duty to
inform the court of any “potential” conflicts so they can be aired and, if
necessary, resolved by court action.73 The Federal Judicial Center, for
example, states that class counsel must disclose to the court “any facet [of a
proposed settlement] that may adversely affect any member of the class or
may result in unequal treatment of class members.”74 This, of course, stands
in some tension with an attorney’s ordinary duty to preserve client
confidences.75
Undue confidence in this approach may have led the judiciary and
most commentators to ignore the pervasive conflict we address here, which
occurs when class counsel has an individual lawyer-client relationship with
a class representative.
II. CLASS COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN REPRESENTING CLASS
REPRESENTATIVES
A lawyer’s concurrent or joint representation of a class and an
individual class representative in connection with a class action lawsuit
entails at least the possibility of a conflict of interest, as would a litigator’s
joint representation of spouses, of a corporation and its principal, or of any
other co-clients. But there is nothing to suggest that lawyers for the class
identify this as a conflict-of-interest problem commanding analysis under
the conflict rules, which call initially for deciding whether the
representation of one client is significantly likely to be limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another.76 And there is certainly nothing in the
professional literature to suggest that lawyers sever their relationships
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009).
73 See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161, 1167
(9th Cir. 2013); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 103-04 (2d
Cir. 2003); Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18; Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157,
1176 (5th Cir. 1978); National Ass’n of Regional Medical Programs v. Mathews, 551 F.2d
340, 346 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128
cmt. d(iii).
74

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.641 at 324 (2004).

75 See Rule 1.6(a), Model Rules of Professional Conduct (deeming confidential
“information relating to the representation”). We are not contending that class counsel
violates this Rule. Arguably disclosures of the type discussed in the main text are “impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation.” Id.
76

ABA Model Rule 1.7.
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with the individual class members after filing a class action, or that lawyers
are expected to do so.
Further, there are various reasons why, if allowed to do so, lawyers
would prefer to maintain the original individual lawyer-client relationships
after filing a class action lawsuit. For example: (1) A promise to maintain
the individual client relationship even after class certification may help
induce the client to hire the lawyer in the first place. (2) If the class action
is not certified, the lawyer may want to return to representing the clients in
pursuing individual claims, particularly when individual claims have
significant monetary value. (3) Preserving the individual relationship may
facilitate the receipt of fees for work relating to the individual
representation before the class action was filed. (4) Preserving the
irelationship may (for better or worse) help maintain a good relationship
with the class representative in acting as a fiduciary for the benefit of the
class. Class counsel might desire this because it would be in the class’s best
interest or, alternately, because class counsel, seeking to maximize their
private interests, desire less oversight by class representatives. (5) Class
counsel may perceive it to be disloyal or disadvantageous to the client to
terminate the original, individual representation upon appointment as
class counsel.
The concurrent representation of a class (or putative class) and an
individual serving (or proposing to serve) as class representative would not
be problematic if the individual client’s interests were always perfectly
aligned with those of the class throughout the lawsuit. But their interests
may in fact diverge, because the class representative’s interest in obtaining
the most favorable outcome individually may differ from the class’s interest
in obtaining the best outcome for the class members collectively, and the
class representative may have opportunities to further its individual selfinterest at the class’s expense.
Divergence of interests between class representatives and the class
as a whole could in theory be present in any class action. But in practice, the
prevalence and strength of divergence will likely often vary with factors
such as the nature of the injury, the nature of the legal claim, and the type
of relief sought. For example, a cause of action with a statutory damages
cap77 will provide different incentives for plaintiffs than one without.
77 See, e.g., Geismann v. ZocDoc Inc., 850 F.3d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing a class
action with claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, which
contains damages caps).
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Plaintiffs in mass tort class actions involving serious injuries or death likely
have very strong interests “in individually controlling the prosecution” of
his or her case,78 stronger than those of plaintiffs with, for example, very
low-stakes consumer law claims.79 Keeping in mind the diversity of factors
that may influence plaintiffs’ incentives and decisionmaking in the class
action context, we review three scenarios in which divergences of interest
between class representatives and absent class members are likely to arise.
A. Holdouts
Even though a class representative’s claims must be “typical” of
those asserted by the class,80 that representative’s personal interests may
differ from those of class members in ways that may make a settlement
more or less advantageous for the individual.81 For instance, a class
representative might have a greater or less appetite for litigation risk than
the average class member, or a different preferred time horizon for
realizing the expected financial or other gains of the litigation. The class
representative may simply disagree with class counsel or other class
members about the advisability of a proposed settlement. 82 In any of these
cases, the class may benefit from a settlement that the class representative
opposes.83
78

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616 (involving claims arising from asbestos exposure).

See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “in
consumer class actions . . . the percentage of class members who file claims is often quite
low,” well below one percent).
79

80

Rule 23(a)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Jay Tidmarsh addressed this possibility in an article discussing why particular class
members may not be adequate representatives of the class. Tidmarsh, supra note 17. See
generally Miller, supra note 11, at 622 (“It is often the case that the proposed
representative plaintiff has features that differ from the class as a whole which may place
this individual in some degree of tension or conflict with other class members.”).
81

See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 27, 30 (1st
Cir. 2009) (reviewing objections to settlement by one named representative).
82

Of course, a dispute between class counsel and class representatives may also reflect
that class counsel is acting self-interestedly, to the class’s detriment. Courts and
commentators recognize that class counsel may have systematically different preferences
about settlement than class members. See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787
(7th Cir. 2014); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). For
example, class counsel have incentives to settle quickly, before investing too many
resources in litigation, in a way that often cuts against the interests of the class. See, e.g.,
Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class
Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 38–40 (2002); Coffee, supra note 4, at 390-91; Janet
Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 358 (1998).
83
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There is obviously a conflict of interest if the class representative
holds out against a settlement that class counsel believes to be in the class’s
best interest: in a fairness hearing,84 the lawyer cannot simultaneously
advocate for the settlement on behalf of the class while opposing it on
behalf of the individual client.85 At that point, under a traditional Model
Rules approach, the lawyer would have to withdraw from representing the
class, the individual client, or both.86 In class actions, courts rarely require
a conflicted class counsel to withdraw entirely from all representations.
For example, in the “Agent Orange” class action, two of the class counsel
who served on the plaintiffs’ management committee were permitted to
stop representing the class but to continue representing individual clients
in their objections to a settlement.87 In light of the benefit of having the
objections put forth by lawyers who were familiar with the litigation, the
court declined to apply traditional conflict-of-interest principles, which
would likely have precluded the lawyers from acting adversely to the class,
which they had previously represented in the same matter.88
Conversely, in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp.,89 the Third Circuit
permitted class counsel to advocate for a settlement on behalf of the class

84

See Rule 23(e)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.

See, e.g., Flores v. Mamma Lombardi’s of Holbrook, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 290 (E.D.N.Y.
May 18, 2015) (“That Mr. Romero negotiated a settlement on behalf of the class, then
helped draft objections to that settlement on behalf of certain class members and, finally,
reversed positions again to argue against those objections is most troubling. Worse yet, . .
. Mr. Romero has the unbridled temerity to bill for hours spent consulting on objections to
the very settlement he negotiated on behalf of the class.”).
85

See, e.g., Rule 1.7, cmt. 4, ABA Model Rules (“If a conflict arises after representation
has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation,
unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client . . . Where more than one
client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is
determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client
and by the lawyer’s ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given
the lawyer’s duties to the former client.”); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal
Op. 2005-05 (“[W]hen two clients will not consent to a conflict of interest, and the conflict
requires consent, the law firm must withdraw from representation of at least one of the
clients.”).
86

87

In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986).

88 Id. at 18-19. Similarly, in In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.
1984), the court permitted class counsel to withdraw from representing the class while
continuing to represent former class representatives who opposed a settlement.
89

166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999).
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over the opposition of class representatives who were former clients.90 The
Lazy Oil court did not comment on the problem that gave rise to the conflict
of interest in the first place: the lawyers’ concurrent representation of the
class and class representatives. The court addressed only whether the
lawyer, having withdrawn from representing the objecting individual
client, could represent the class against the objector. The court may have
assumed that this problem could have arisen whether or not the lawyer had
jointly represented the class and the individual: the objector would have
been a former client even if the lawyer had ended the individual
representation as soon as the class was certified.
The courts in Lazy Oil and cases like it overlook how class counsel’s
conflict may have affected the representation before the lawyer chose sides.
Suppose, for example, that the individual client in Lazy Oil was uncertain
whether to support the proposed settlement and asked for the lawyer’s
advice. If the settlement was in fact disadvantageous to the individual
client, the lawyer could not so advise without being disloyal to the class and
prejudicing its interests. And, having concluded that the class would benefit
from the settlement, the lawyer might not recognize that the individual
client should opt out, and perhaps even oppose, the settlement. At that
point, class counsel could not give disinterested advice to the individual.
Or suppose that class counsel had not yet decided whether to
advocate for a possible settlement, and the individual client strongly
opposed the settlement or would be better off without it. At that point, the
lawyer could not make a disinterested judgment on behalf of the class. If
the lawyer represented the class alone, the lawyer would be required to
consider class representatives’ views but not necessarily defer to them. If
class representatives are also individual clients, however, the duties of
loyalty and competence would require the lawyer to seek to carry out their
objectives. In the “Agent Orange” class action, where multiple class counsel
represented individual claimants with different views, the conflict may not
have prejudiced the class. But in a case where a single class counsel owes
allegiance to a lead plaintiff who is also an individual client, and who
opposes a possible settlement, the lawyer may ultimately decline to
advance the settlement, to the class’s detriment, out of loyalty to the
Id. at 590 (permitting the representation “as long as the interest of the class in
continued representation by experienced counsel is not outweighed by the actual
prejudice to the objectors of being opposed by their former counsel”). Although class
counsel may seek court approval for a settlement even if the representative plaintiff
disagrees, the representative plaintiff’s objection cause the court to scrutinize a proposed
settlement more closely.
90
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individual. Class counsel may be influenced unconsciously as well as
consciously: they may not realize that their assessment of the proposed
settlement is influenced by their concern for the class representative’s
personal interests or preferences.
B. Sellouts
Another conflict may arise when the class representative proposes
to settle the individual claim on its own. Nothing in the law forecloses the
putative class representative from settling separately with the defendant
and, if there are no other class representatives, dismissing the class action
lawsuit.91 Individual claims of a representative of a certified class may also
be settled, with the class action remaining in hiatus while a new class
representative is sought. The individual settlement may be a legitimate
response to uncertainties about the viability of a class action.92 In many
cases, although the individual will be acting self-interestedly, the absent
class members will not be disadvantaged, either because they are
uninterested in filing individual or class claims,93 or because they will not
See, e.g., Mars Steel v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th
Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit begun as a class action may often and quite properly be settled as an
individual action, that is, without preclusive effect on other members of the class”). Cf.
Kulig v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 13-Civ.-4715, 2014 WL 5017817, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2014) (stating that putative class counsel acted unethically by not communicating a
proposed settlement offer to individual clients who were seeking to be class
representatives); Victorino v. FCA US LLC, 322 F.R.D. 403, 407-08 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (same);
Robert Alan Ins. Agency v. Girard Bank, 107 F.R.D. 271, (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“[It is not ‘improper
for a potential class representative on his behalf to attempt, before filing suit, to negotiate
a settlement for himself.’”). Prior to 2003 amendments, some courts interpreted Rule 23
to require court approval before a putative class representative could settle individually.
It is now clear that that is not required. See Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments
to Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. If a court sees evidence that putative class representatives are
using the class allegations to try to extract individual settlements, the court may make
appropriate orders to protect against “an unintended use of the class action device.”
Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music, 586 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1978).
91

Cf. Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680 (“Settlement negotiations are made more complicated
when the parties don’t know whether they are trying to settle a class action or an action
limited to the named plaintiffs, don't know whether the named plaintiffs would be deemed
adequate representatives of the class if the case proceeded to trial, and don’t know the
composition and size of the class.”).
92

See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class actions create the opportunity for a
kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a
large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess
of the individual claims’ actual worth.”).
93
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be prejudiced from now doing so.94 But in other cases, the class
representative may be essentially selling out the class,95 using the class
action for its individual benefit and to the detriment of absent class
members, who may find it harder to advance their claims because of the
passage of time, difficulty locating someone else willing to undertake the
burden of being a class representative, or strategic decisions made by
putative class counsel before abandoning the lawsuit.96
If the individual client expresses an interest in pursuing its financial
self-interest by negotiating an individual settlement, the lawyer who jointly
represents the individual and the class has a conflict of interest.
Presumably it is precisely because a defendant thinks that it will prejudice
the class or putative class that that defendant is seeking to settle a class
representative’s individual claim. The defendant would likely not be willing
to settle with the individual if the class action would continue
uninterrupted with the quick substitution of another party that would serve
equally well as lead plaintiff. But if a settlement is in the individual client’s
interest, the lawyer cannot pursue it or encourage it without thereby
betraying the class. Conversely, if class counsel promotes the best interests
of the class as a whole—as courts and commentators suggest—the lawyer
will betray the individual client by discouraging or impeding the individual
settlement. Even if the lawyer honestly believes that the settlement is not
in the individual’s interest, the lawyer cannot be certain that this
assessment is objective, unaffected by the interests of the class. The conflict
makes it ethically perilous to advise the individual client what to do or to
Individual settlement should not affect class claims as a formal legal matter. See
generally Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 593 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff who
files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the
class is certified.”); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011) (“Neither a proposed
class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.”). An individual settlement
does not have a preclusive effect on class claims, see Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681, and tolling
should generally be available to extend the statutes of limitations on class claims, see, e.g.,
In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 256 (2d Cir. 2007).
94

See, e.g., Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978) (accusing
the putative class representative and class counsel of attempting to sell out the class to
leverage a higher individual settlement).
95

See generally Robert D. Phillips, Jr. & Samuel J. Park, Ethical Issues in Class Action
Settlements, in 1 MARCY HOGAN GREER ED., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 941, 967
(2017) (stating that “settling a putative class action on an individual basis with the named
plaintiffs” is a “tactical” approach that “often makes sense from a defense perspective, as
settling with the named plaintiffs is less costly than settling with the entire class and doing
so
may
derail
the
class
action”).
96
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negotiate with the defendant on the individual’s behalf.
Even if the plaintiff does not initiate an individual settlement, a
defendant may seek to “pick off” the named plaintiff by offering an
individual settlement, perhaps for as much or more than the full amount
claimed.97 If the class member is primarily driven by financial self-interest,
the proposed settlement will be attractive: the party’s claim will be fully
satisfied without further delay and the party avoids the further time and
expense of representing the class. Presumably, class counsel previously
explained the role of class representative and sought some assurance that
the client would stay the course, but nothing binds the client to earlier
assurances. At that point, the client might turn to class counsel for advice
whether to accept the offer or continue to serve in the fiduciary role as
named plaintiff. Again, this creates a conflict from the perspective of both
clients – the class member and the class. From the named plaintiff’s
perspective, there is a risk that the lawyer will not render disinterested
advice: out of loyalty to the class, the lawyer may discourage a settlement
that is in the client’s best interest. From the class’s perspective, the risk is
that the lawyer will act disloyally: the lawyer may encourage the individual
client to accept the offer when doing so would harm the class.
As this example reflects, the conflict may be outside class counsel’s
control and unavoidable: even if the class representative is initially
disinclined to act opportunistically, once the defendant makes a settlement
offer to the class representative individually, the lawyer must convey it.98
Ordinarily, the lawyer must also advise the class representative about the
offer’s relative merits. The lawyer cannot simply convey the offer and say
nothing further, depriving the client of advice altogether.99 But the lawyer
also cannot give disinterested advice.
Any response to the conflict now is costly. First, the lawyer might
seek the court’s permission to withdraw from representing the class. If the
97 See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016); Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016
U.S. App. LEXIS 6627 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016).
98

See cases cited in supra note 91.

See Rule 1.1, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client.”); id. Rule 1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. . . . A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.”); id. Rule 1.4(a) (“A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the
client's informed consent . . . is required by these Rules.”).
99
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court approves, co-counsel from other law firms, if available, may pick up
the slack. If none are available, the lawyer’s withdrawal would impede, if
not entirely derail, the class action lawsuit. This may harm the individual as
well as the class, since an individual settlement might collapse. Further, if
the lawyer must withdraw before advising the individual client and
commencing negotiations, the individual may lose the leverage that the
class action afforded.
Second, the lawyer might stop representing the class representative
individually. But the individual client might then feel betrayed and be
disadvantaged by having to retain a new lawyer who is unfamiliar with the
case and with whom the individual has no prior relationship. The ability to
conclude a favorable individual settlement may be impeded by the delay,
while the new lawyer takes time learning the relevant facts. And the time
and expense may prove to be for naught if no individual deal is made.
Third, class counsel might limit the scope of the representation of
the individual class representative by carving out assistance regarding a
possible settlement.100 Class representatives in this scenario might be
required either to negotiate with the defendant on their own or to retain or
rely on other lawyers to assist them. Institutional clients, for example,
might employ in-house counsel or other outside counsel with whom they
already have a relationship. In that event, however, the client would lose
the benefit of the lawyer who is most familiar with the lawsuit and who may
have had sustained dealings with opposing counsel.
Finally, class counsel might attempt to limit the scope of the
representation of the class, so that, in negotiating on behalf of the
individual, the lawyer will owe no loyalty duty to the class. This is, of
course, another way of saying that the lawyer will be free to be disloyal to
the class and to serve the individual’s interests at the class’s expense. One
might justify this limitation on the theory that, as a legal abstraction, the
class will not perceive that it is being betrayed and its trust in the lawyer
will not diminish as a consequence. But the class may suffer concretely as
well. For example, by forgoing counsel’s loyalty during negotiations with
the defendant, the class may be giving up the opportunity to negotiate a
favorable class settlement. Needless to say, a lawyer could not unilaterally
limit the representation of the class. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
100 See Rule 1.2(c), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer may limit the
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the
client gives informed consent.”).
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would seem to prohibit this approach.101 But possibly a lawyer might seek
a court’s authorization to proceed in this manner.
This conflict between the named representative’s interest in
negotiating an individual settlement and the class’s interests arguably
exists even if neither the defendant nor the class representative proposes
such a settlement, at any point in the representation when an individual
settlement is a plausible option that the individual might be open to
pursuing. A lawyer has a duty to discuss the possibility of settlement with
a client in a lawsuit.102 Even if the client at the outset had no interest in
pursuing an individual settlement, under the Model Rules approach the
lawyer could not make it a condition of the retention that the client would
not have a change of heart, any more than a criminal defense lawyer can
demand that the accused promise not to plead guilty: the decision whether
to settle a dispute belongs irrevocably to the client.103 Retainer agreements
suggest, however, that some lawyers try to bar clients who become putative
class representatives from settling individually.104 Other retainer
agreements require putative class representatives to agree to be dropped
as clients if a conflict arises with another client105—a clause that might be
invoked if the client wanted to accept an individual settlement over the
objection of the class counsel. Notwithstanding these attempts to contract
around the rules, a lawyer for individual class members may have an
obligation to raise the possibility of an individual settlement. At each such
point, if the lawyer also represents the class, the lawyer will have a conflict
of interest.
101 See Rule 23(g)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent

the interests of the class.)
102 Cf. Rule 1.4. comment 2, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“[A] lawyer who

receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy . . . must
promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that
the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or
to reject the offer.”).
103 See Rule 1.2(a), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

See, e.g., Retainer Agreement—Class Action, ECF No. 84-2, BABB Real Estate LLC v.
Bennett, Shelaine, No. 3:10-cv-00119 (W.D. Wisc.) (“Client understands that it cannot settle
a class action lawsuit without protecting the interests of the other class members.”).
104

See, e.g., Letter from Frank E. Marchetti to Christine Anderson, ECF No. 16-1,
Anderson v. PODS of Los Angeles, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-04893 (C.D. Cal.) (“You understand that
Attorney will not be able to represent you if Attorney’s representation of you would create
a conflict with one of the Attorney’s existing clients . . . . You expressly agree to immediately
consent to Attorney substituting out as your attorney of record after a lawsuit is filed if
Attorney learns through discovery of such a conflict.”).
105
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C. Payouts
The possibility of payouts is a third recurring situation where
conflicts arise between the interests of the class and a class representative
who also has an individual attorney-client relationship with class counsel.
With some frequency, class representatives seek or are promised by
counsel a unique amount of monetary compensation, greater than what
other class members will receive, often in conflict with the class’s
interests.106 So-called “incentive awards” to class representatives are
common,107 and are typically determined following a settlement.108 There
is nothing inherently wrong with such payouts when they are negotiated
after settlement—except in securities class actions where a statute has
altered the law.109 But the case reports are full of examples of class
representatives and class counsel negotiating an individual windfall payout
to the representative before a settlement is approved, sometimes as a
condition of the class representative supporting the settlement.
The most abusive form of these deals involves significant benefits to
both class representatives and class counsel, and little or nothing of value
for the class. In one case, a disability discrimination class action was settled
against the owner of gasoline service stations with a $5,000 payment to the
named plaintiff, $50,000 in attorney’s fees, injunctive relief that simply
required the corporation to “meet its legal obligations (or perhaps even less
than that required) under the [Americans with Disabilities Act],” and a very
broad release of the absent class members’ statutory damages claims.110
Another example is a settlement of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class
106 See, e.g., Fleury v. Richemont North America, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, *10 n.5 (N.D.
Cal. July 3, 2008).
107 Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Such awards
are discretionary, . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done
on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing
the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney
general.”); see generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class
Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1303 (2006).
108

See Rodriguez., 563 F.3d at 959.

109 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (requiring a putative lead plaintiff in a securities
class action to file with the court a sworn certification that “the plaintiff will not accept any
payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff’s pro
rata share of any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court”).
110 Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 942, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2003) (subsequent history
omitted).
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suit that provided for $2,000 to the named plaintiff, a small donation to a
law school clinic, $78,000 in attorney’s fees, and a release that left absent
class members able to bring their own individual damages suits but not a
subsequent class action.111 Both settlements were approved by district
court judges but reversed on appeal as unfair to the classes.
Defendants are happy to make deals like this, if they can secure
approval of class counsel and the courts. The ready possibility of securing
deals that sell out the absent class members to benefit the class
representative and class counsel puts class counsel in an inherently
conflicted position. District and appellate courts do reject some of these
settlements as unfair to the class. As a result, a lawyer for the class and class
representative individually might argue that he or she has no duty to
counsel the individual client about the possibility of a deal, and therefore
no conflict between duties to the class and the class representative
individually. In our view, however, because not all of these deals are
rejected, the conflict remains.
To see why, consider the case of incentive payments to class
representatives, negotiated prior to settlement, with the settlement also
giving real benefits to the absent class members. For example, the Ninth
Circuit recently considered a settlement in Fair Credit Reporting Act case
against credit rating agencies which issued credit reports that continued to
list debts as delinquent that had been discharged in bankruptcy.112 Absent
class members received some value from the settlement. An injunction
required the three defendants, which dominate the credit reporting market,
to “presume the discharge of certain pre-bankruptcy debts” going
forward.113 Class members who could prove that a negative credit report
contributed to denial of employment got $750; denials of a mortgage or
housing rental paid $500; and denials of consumer credit or auto loans paid
$150. Class members who could not prove actual damages received about
$26 as “convenience awards.”114 Class representatives, however, were
promised $5,000 each—far more than absent class members—on the
express condition that they support the settlement.115
111

Crawford v. Equifax Payment Services, Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 800 (7th Cir. 2000).

See Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir.
2013).
112

113

Id. at 1162.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 1164-65.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548872

GREEN & KENT

31

This was a conflict from both the individual client’s perspective and
the class’s perspective. The lawyer could not negotiate on behalf of both
the individual class member and the class.
Helping the class
representatives to a better deal hurt the class, by depriving it of the class
representatives’ fiduciary role in protecting absent class members, and by
directing money away from absent class members into the pockets of the
representatives. It is considered axiomatic in the class action literature that
defendants care only about the total dollar value of a settlement, but not
about how the dollars are divided between class counsel, class
representatives, and absent class members.116 Choices by class
representatives and class counsel about allocating settlement money are
zero-sum and hence necessarily put counsel in a conflicted position when
counsel owes duties simultaneously to the class and the class
representatives.
III.

WHEN DOES CLASS COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST FIRST BEGIN?

As described in Part II, lawyers who jointly represent a class and its
individual class representative will have a conflict of interest at least at the
point when the class representative opposes a favorable settlement of the
class action, seeks a favorable individual settlement that will prejudice
absent class members, or seeks an incentive payment or other individual
benefit from the settlement of the class action that exceeds the benefits
afforded to absent class members. At these moments, the conflicting
interests of the class and the individual client make it difficult or impossible
for the lawyer to serve both clients competently and loyally. One might say
that the lawyer’s conflict of interest is now manifest, patent, real or
actual.117
One question this raises is, when should lawyers in class actions first
address the problem of their clients’ differing interests? May lawyers wait
to see whether the conflict becomes manifest, as may occur in only a
fraction of class actions, or does the risk of a manifest conflict of interest
require the court and lawyer to address the problem at the certification
stage, or even earlier? This is an important question that judicial decisions
See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“The
defendant cares only about the size of the settlement, not how it is divided between
attorneys’ fees and compensation for the class.”).
117 These are all terms used to convey that the problem actually now exists – it is not
conjectural or in the future.
116
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and other writings overlook, with the result that lawyers have been free to
ignore conflicts of interest until they compromise the representation (and,
in some cases, even then).118 Once litigation is well advanced, lawyers,
courts, and clients often feel significant pressure to stay the course, even if
the conflict is a serious one. This part addresses these questions of timing
from the perspective of two points in time.
Part A focuses on the class certification stage. It discusses how
professional conduct rules governing conflicts of interest deal with what
might be described as “nascent conflicts” or potential conflicts among joint
clients – that is, the situation early in the representation when the joint
clients’ conflicting interests have not yet put the lawyer in a bind, but when
a lawyer can nevertheless envision the possibility that a conflict may
become manifest as the representation unfolds.119 Part B looks at the
earlier moment in time when the lawyer files a class action complaint on
behalf of a putative class representative whom the lawyer also represents
individually. It considers whether a lawyer filing a class action lawsuit must
address the nascent conflict at the outset, even before the lawyer formally
represents the class, because the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the nascent
class give rise to a conflict of interest from the perspective of the individual
client, the absent class members, or both.120 Although neither the absent
class members nor the class itself are clients as a legal matter, and therefore
the lawyer is not engaged in a joint representation of clients with conflicting
interests, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to Rule
23, among others, hold that, after filing a class action, the lawyer owes
duties to the absent class members or to the nascent or putative class.121 If
so, the lawyer’s representation of the individual may be compromised by
Courts are more concerned with the lawyer’s self-interest than with the conflicting
interests of the class and the class representatives. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 72 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (“[I]t is a reality of class action life that the potential
for such abuse lies chiefly in the hands of plaintiff's counsel who, as a negotiator,
unfortunately must represent three distinct and inherently conflicting interests: the
named plaintiff's, the asserted class members' and his own. . . .”).
118

119 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass Darkly”: How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1212 (1989) (distinguishing
“an actual or nascent conflict”). More often, particularly in the criminal context, the
literature distinguishes between “actual” and “potential” conflicts. See, e.g., Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 165 (2002).
120 The term “nascent class” is used occasionally in the literature, see, for example, In re
Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (D. Md. 1983), but the
term “putative class” is used far more commonly to describe the class before it is certified.
121

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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the lawyer’s conflicting duties, if not by a conflicting representation, and the
lawyer’s ability to act for the nascent class’s benefit may be compromised
by the lawyer’s duties to the individual client.
A. Nascent Conflicts: The Class Certification Stage
Under the Model Rules, in the situations described in Part II, the
lawyer would likely have a conflict of interest at the outset of the joint
representation. That is true even if no one anticipates that class
representatives will necessary act in their own interest as distinct from
those of the class. Their interests differ now, and there is a risk that, later,
the conflicting interests will have implications for the lawyer’s work.
Conflict of interest rules regulate the risk that trouble will arise later, even
if joint clients are harmonious at the start.
The threshold question in representing joint clients, such as a class
and a class representative, is whether there is a “significant risk” that the
lawyer’s representation of one will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
duties to the other.122 This calls for the lawyer to make a prediction in light
of the respective clients’ interests, the nature of the representation, and the
lawyer’s experience, among other considerations.123
Further, this
judgment must be made against the background of professional writing,
including judicial decisions and bar association opinions, that have applied
and given meaning to the conflict rule in the past. A joint representation of
parties to a lawsuit is frequently a conflict of interest, because the co-clients
often have differing interests and, given the nature of litigation, the risk is
often “significant” (as opposed to “insignificant”) that, at some point, as the
litigation progresses, the lawyer’s duties to one will compromise the
lawyer’s representation of the other.124
If class counsel intends to represent class representatives
122

Rule 1.7(a)(2), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

See generally Rule 1.7 cmt. 8, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“The mere
possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical
questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment
in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be
pursued on behalf of the client.”).
123

124 See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. On Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2017-7 (“Joint
representation of multiple parties to a litigation . . . often involves a conflict of interest
because there is a significant risk that the clients will differ as to, for example, litigation
strategy or cooperation and resolution.”).
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individually after the class is certified, the joint representation almost
certainly will constitute a conflict. There will be a “significant risk” that, at
some later point, unless the lawyer withdraws from one of the
representations or limits its scope, the lawyer’s duties to the class will
compromise the lawyer’s representation of the class representative, or
versa.125 The question is whether, under the conflict rules, the lawyer may
undertake or continue the joint representation despite this risk. The rules
are somewhat paternalistic: they forbid the joint representation even with
the respective clients’ informed consent unless lawyers reasonably believe
that they can represent each client competently and diligently despite the
conflict.126 But the authorities interpreting and applying the rules
ordinarily allow joint clients whose interests are generally aligned to
assume the risk that, down the road, there will be a parting of the ways. In
that event, the lawyer may represent both with the respective clients’
“informed consent.”127
The takeaway is that lawyers jointly representing a class
representative and the class cannot blithely ignore the risks until a conflict
of interest manifests itself. They must assess the likelihood that the class
representatives will try to benefit at the class’s expense. If that is the class
representatives’ objective from the outset, the joint representation is likely
improper, because the risk that the clients will be competing with each
other will be too high. In that event, the lawyer might seek to be appointed
as class counsel but drop the individual client; or the lawyer might continue
representing the individual and try to identify another lawyer to be
appointed to serve as class counsel – but the lawyer cannot do both. Case
law suggests that class counsel in such a position is not supposed to make
these decisions privately. Conflicts and potential conflicts must be called to
the district court’s attention,128 and counsel must seek the court’s direction
for how to resolve the conflict. One reason is that the Rules’ requirement
that each affected client give informed consent when joint representations
involve conflicts of interest129 cannot practically be applied to absent class
members, who can number in the thousands in many class actions.130
Cf. Stuhan & Costello, supra note 11, at 1200 (“[T]he stakes are typically too high [in
class actions] . . . to wait until a conflict becomes manifest and obvious”).
125

126

Rule 1.7(b), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

127

Rule 1.7(b)(4), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

128

See supra note __ and accompanying text.

129

Rule 1.7(b)(4), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; id. Rule 1.4(a) and (b).

See generally LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 465 (3d ed. 2012) (“It is not practicable to sit down with each member of a large class
130
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B. Nascent Classes: The Beginning of the Lawsuit
Whether a lawyer who files a class action has a conflict of interest
even before the class is certified is a difficult question because of the
uncertainty regarding the lawyer’s duties (if any) to the nascent class. Until
the class is certified, the class does not exist as a legal entity, and therefore,
the lawyer would seem to have only one client: the prospective class
representative who is the plaintiff in the lawsuit.131 But it is conceivable
that the lawyer nevertheless owes duties to absent class members, or to the
nascent class, that limit the lawyer’s ordinary zeal on behalf of the
individual. As noted, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003
amendments to Rule 23, and others, conclude that, after filing a class action
and before class certification, the lawyer owes a duty to act in the best
interest of the absent putative class members or to the nascent or putative
class.132 Some courts have apparently gone further, stating that lawyers
who file a class action lawsuit have fiduciary duties to the absent class
members.133 But these decisions have not elaborated on the nature and
extent of those duties or explained how a lawyer should address the tension
between the individual client’s interests and conflicting duties to the
to explain possible conflicts and obtain meaningful informed consent.”); Cooper, supra
note 23, at 39 (“Counsel for the class seldom is in a position to consult with each class
member to determine individual interests and needs, or to measure and reconcile the
conflicts among individual interests and needs.”). Class counsel must, however, explain the
implications of the joint representation – the benefits, risks and alternatives – and secure
the informed consent of class representatives who are also individual clients.
Stuhan & Costello, supra note 11, at 1205 & n.43(“[U]ntil a class is certified, there is
no formal attorney-client relationship between the putative class and putative class
counsel.”) (citing authority).
131

132

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

133 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass attorneys, purporting to represent a class, also owe the entire
class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint is filed”); Fleury v. Richemont North
America, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, *44 (N.D. Ca. July 3, 2008) (citing authority); see
generally Nick Landsman-Roos, Note, Front‐End Fiduciaries: Precertification Duties and
Class Conflict, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 838 (2013): “While there is agreement that counsel
owes a fiduciary duty to a certified class, the existence of such a relationship in the
precertification stage is far from clear. The majority view is that before class certification,
the putative class members are not ‘represented’ by class counsel and thus are not owed a
fiduciary duty. Yet a number of courts have held that, even in the absence of class
certification, class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to unnamed class members in the
precertification period. Regardless of the position taken, these decisions are largely bereft
of reasoning.”
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putative class. In general, at the pre-certification stage, the conflict with
which courts are concerned does not involve the competing interests of the
class and class representatives but the risk that the lawyers will give
primacy to their own legal fees.134 There is no definitive statement to be
found about duties to a nascent class in either Rule 23, its case law, or the
Model Rules.
That neither the nascent class nor the absent class members are a
client at this stage does not mean that the lawyer cannot owe them duties
once the class action is filed. There is nothing anomalous about owing
duties to a non-client. Lawyers may assume a duty of competence to third
parties for whom (in the course of representing a client) they prepare an
opinion letter;135 they may also assume a competence duty to a client’s
beneficiaries.136 Nor is it unprecedented for lawyers to owe duties to
“nascent” clients. Some authorities recognize, for example, that lawyers
representing clients in forming a corporation may assume duties to the yetto-be-formed corporation.137
In these examples, however, the lawyer undertakes duties to third
parties by express or implied agreement either with the lawyer’s client or
with the third parties themselves. When a lawyer assumes duties to an
unformed corporation, it is because the lawyer has agreed to do so with the
individual clients who retained the lawyer to establish the corporation.
When a lawyer undertakes duties to a third party for whom the lawyer
prepares an opinion letter, it is because the lawyer agreed with the third
party to do so. A third party is not necessarily entitled to rely on opinion
letters prepared by lawyers exclusively for the lawyers’ clients.138 But if the
lawyer agrees to provide an opinion to a prospective buyer or agrees that
134 See, e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429, 439
(D.N.J. 2000).
135

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2).

136

Id. § 51(3).

See, e.g., Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992) (where lawyer represents
a person for the purpose of incorporating an entity, following the incorporation the
lawyer’s earlier representation will be “deemed to be representation of the entity, not the
person”); State Bar of Az., Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002) (“[A] lawyer may represent an entity
during the formation process, as long as the constituents who are acting on behalf of the
yet-to-be-formed entity understand and agree to the entity being the client”).
137

138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. e (“A lawyer may avoid
liability to nonclients . . . by making clear that an opinion or representation is directed only
to a client and should not be relied on by others.”).
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the prospective buyer may receive and rely on the lawyer’s opinion, the
lawyer undertakes a duty of competence to that non-client.139
In contrast, it is implausible that a lawyer who files a class action
complaint on behalf of an individual seeking to serve as class representative
thereby agrees with (1) absent class members, (2) the individual client, or
(3) the nascent class, to serve absent class members, or the nascent class,
competently or loyally. The filing plainly is not preceded by an agreement
between the lawyer and the absent class members: The lawyer may have
no interaction at all with absent class members, who, for their part, may be
unaware of the lawsuit. Nor does the filing necessarily connote the lawyer’s
agreement with the individual client to serve absent class members as
beneficiaries. As the case law reflects, the individual class members may
opt to exploit the class action in various ways for their own benefit.
Whether the individuals direct the lawyer to act partly or solely in the
interests of absent class members is up to them. And, of course, the lawyer
has not agreed with the nascent, legally nonexistent class.
If the lawyer assumes duties to the nascent class, it cannot be by
virtue of agreement, but only by operation of law. The law can impose
duties on lawyers beyond those to which lawyers agree. For example, rules
of professional conduct require lawyers to assume a host of duties to the
court that may restrict lawyers’ ability to advance clients’ interests.140
Lawyers assume confidentiality duties to prospective clients regardless of
whether they agree to do so.141 And, indeed, the duties that lawyers owe to
clients are largely established by professional conduct rules and agency
law, not by contract.
For reasons others have identified, courts probably should declare,
as some have, that lawyers filing class actions assume fiduciary duties to
absent class members or to the nascent class. Substantial work is typically
performed prior to class certification with the court’s expectation that the
lawyer is acting for the class’s benefit. Recognizing this, Rule 23 was
amended in 2003 to allow the appointment of “interim” class counsel prior
139 Id. (a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient whom the lawyer invites to rely on
the lawyer’s opinion, if the nonclient reasonably does so).
140 See, e.g., Rule 3.3(a)(3), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“If a lawyer, the
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the
lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
141

See Rule 1.18(b), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
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to adjudication of a certification motion.142 As the Advisory Committee
Notes discuss, whether or not counsel is formally designated as “interim,”
“[b]efore class certification . . . it will usually be important for an attorney
to take action to prepare for the certification decision,” such as engaging in
discovery relevant to certification, making or responding to other motions,
and perhaps discussing settlement.143
If one concludes, as a matter of law, that the named plaintiff’s lawyer
in a pre-certification class action must act in the best interests of the
nascent class, even if it is not a client in a legal sense, the question then
becomes, what are the scope and limits of the lawyer’s duties to the nascent
class? On this question, the law is not only unhelpful but conflicting. In the
context of individuals’ settlements, courts have relatively low expectations
of the lawyers. But in the context of pre-certification class settlements,
courts have high expectations. A lawyer who explores both individual and
class settlements simultaneously cannot give primacy to both the
individual’s interests and the class’s interests.
At least in negotiating a settlement on behalf of a class
representative individually, it might be argued that the lawyers’ fiduciary
duty is, at most, to avoid affirmatively prejudicing absent class members.144
Prior to the 2003 amendment to Rule 23, courts debated whether court
approval was required when the class representative proposed to settle
individually and dismiss the class action. Courts expressed concern with
settlements that used the threat of a class action to benefit the individual
claimant, to the possible disadvantage of the absent class members.145 Even
if absent class members were not legally bound by the settlement, they
might have relied to their detriment on the assumption that the class action
would be litigated. They may have decided to await the outcome of the
lawsuit rather than to take other available measures, such as filing an
142

Rule 23(g)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P.

143

Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments to Rule 23.

See Landsman-Roos, supra note 133, at 842 (“the scope of those duties is limited to
protecting the substantive legal rights of putative class members that form the basis of the
class action suit from prejudice”).
144

145 See, e.g., Magana

v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 66-67 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (“[T]he
possibility of ‘legalized blackmail,’ . . . and Rule 23 abuse is at its height during the precertification stage when defendant is literally threatened by potential class-wide liability.
Because the existence of a class has not been determined, the likelihood increases that
plaintiff and his counsel will unduly sacrifice the previously-asserted class interest for
private gain.”).
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individual action, filing their own class action, or competing to serve as class
representative and proposing a different lawyer to serve as class counsel.
Courts took various approaches to the problem of individual settlements,
with most concluding that notice to absent class members and judicial
review were necessary if there was a risk that absent class members would
be prejudiced.146 Rule 23(e) now requires notice and court approval only
if class members would be bound by the proposed settlement, which is not
ordinarily the case if the defendant compensates the named plaintiff for
dismissing the lawsuit before the class is certified. One might infer that the
lawyer’s duty to the nascent class, if any, is simply to avoid absent class
members’ detrimental reliance on the lawsuit.
The court will expect more from class counsel, however, if the
lawyers negotiated a settlement for the class during the pre-certification
stage, and then ask the court both to certify the class and to approve the
settlement.147 At that point, the court’s responsibility is to assure that, in
negotiating the settlement, the lawyer acted in the best interest of the class,
not the named plaintiff.148 Looking backward in time, this suggests that the
court will expect the lawyer to have treated the nascent class as a client
during the negotiation stage and, indeed, as between the nascent class and
the class representative, to have given primacy to the nascent class’s
interests. The lawyer may regard loyalty to the nascent class as a fiduciary
duty to the nascent class, as an element of competent representation of the
individual who brought the class action, or simply as a procedural
obligation implicit in Rule 23.
The ideas that lawyers, in the pre-certification stage, may seek to
advance the individual’s interests in disregard of the absent class members,
but at the same time must give primacy to the class’s interests with virtual
disregard of the individual client’s interests, seem hard to reconcilable. But
See, e.g., Schemmer v. Chartone, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35020, *3 (N.D. Ohio
2008): Anderberg v. Masonite Corp., 176 F.R.D. 682 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
146

147 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (stating that proposals

to jointly certify and settle a class action require the courts to “close” and “heightened”
scrutiny to whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The
principal issue presented by these appeals is whether the district judge discharged the
judicial duty to protect the members of a class in class action litigation from lawyers for
the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary obligations, place their
pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class. This problem, repeatedly remarked by
judges and scholars . . . requires district judges to exercise the highest degree of vigilance
in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.”).
148
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one possible explanation is that the duties owed to the nascent class are not
static and unchangeable; rather, they may evolve as the class action
progresses (e.g., as absent class members’ reliance grows) or differ
depending on the task being performed.149
Of course, a distinction between the lawyer’s duties pre- or postappointment as interim lead counsel, or as counsel to a certified class, is
artificial.150 The class is a legal construct that could be constructed at
earlier or later points in the lawsuit. Jean Wegman Burns has proposed, for
example, that class counsel should be required to represent the class from
the time a class action is filed, and that class representatives should be
replaced with another mechanism for monitoring class counsel.151 At that
point, the conflict of interest problem would have a straightforward
solution: barring class counsel from representing individual class members.
Even under the current regime, it is unclear why certification should be the
dividing line. Absent class members’ reliance interests, or other interests,
may not change significantly simply because the class is certified. Likewise,
it seems odd to think that the lawyer’s loyalty to the class in negotiating a
class settlement, and therefore the lawyer’s approach to the negotiations,
should differ depending on whether the lawyer is negotiating for the
nascent class prior to certification or for the class as a “client” after class
certification.
IV.

WHAT SHOULD LAWYERS DO?

That the law is unclear, and that courts seem indifferent, does not
relieve lawyers of their ethical duties to individual clients. Class action law
may define or inform the nature and scope of a lawyer’s duties toward the
“class as a whole,” absent class members, and class representatives. But if
individuals are represented as individuals, a lawyer must still comply with
See Larkin Gen. Hosp., Ltd. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 93 F.R.D. 497, 501-02 (E.D. Pa.
1982). One might also consider whether the lawyer’s duties expand if the lawyer is
appointed to serve as “interim class counsel” under Rule 23(g)(3): Rule 23(g)(4) calls on
class counsel to “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” and this
arguably applies to interim class counsel as well.
149

150 See Landsman-Roos, supra note 133, at 840 (“[I]mposing different pre-and
postcertification fiduciary duties is an artificial, counterintuitive distinction. Nothing
changes in terms of an absent class member's reliance on an attorney before and after
certification. Likewise, the level of control an attorney has over an absent class member's
relevant asset - that is, his claim - remains the same pre-and postcertification.”).
151 Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representation in
Class Actions, 42 Hastings L.J. 165 (1990).
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their state-adopted version of the Model Rules governing communications
with, and disclosures to, a client – e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.4 and 1.7, among
others. Lawyers need to explain both how they propose to act in light of the
legal uncertainty and how the uncertainty may add to the risks. Therefore,
they must take a position in light of the jurisdiction’s law regarding their
pre- and post-certification duties.
Lawyers should explain the ground rules of the class action to their
individual clients, and talk through important issues and questions that
may arise. Will the lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of the individual be limited
by legal duties to the class or the lawyer’s own financial (and perhaps
reputational) interest in seeing the class certified? Is there a risk that the
lawyer’s advice will be untrustworthy, because the lawyer will be taking
account of the class’s interests? Is there a risk that the lawyer will have to
withdraw from representing the individual in order to continue the class
representation? Is there a risk that, if a class is not certified, the lawyer will
seek to drop the individual client because the matter is no longer likely to
be substantially remunerative? These should be substantial, detailed
communications.152
In our view, lawyers should at the outset of the representation
inform their individual clients of those rights which the pressures and
incentives of concurrent class litigation might lead the lawyer to later
downgrade or ignore. For example, an individual client might be informed
of her absolute right to seek a settlement at any time and to approve or
disapprove any settlement offer. An individual client might also usefully be
informed of the right to have her attorney keep her reasonably informed of
the status of the matter, and to fully inform her about potential conflicts.
One cannot eavesdrop on privileged communications between class
actions lawyers and individual clients to know whether these kinds of
communications occur. Our sense that they rarely do is based on a dearth
of case law or professional literature recommending or mandating such
communications, and the fact that almost all of the retainer agreements we
reviewed were brief and vague. If our intuition is correct, then any
communication along the lines proposed would improve on the status quo.
One approach that some lawyers take seems improper.

Some

152 Cf. Rule 1.4(b), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”).
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retainer agreements we reviewed contemplate an individual
representation and a filing for class certification, and then state that the
client waives all future conflicts,153 or agrees to be dropped as a client if any
future conflicts arise.154 Such a barebones waiver provision is antithetical
to the concept of “informed consent” in the context of conflicts of interest.
Informed consent ordinarily requires an explanation of the facts giving rise
to a conflict of interest, and an explanation of the risks, benefits and
alternatives.155 Many courts are skeptical of advanced waivers of conflicts
of interest, precisely because the relevant facts giving risk to a conflict are
not yet known.156 At a minimum, for consent to be effective in advance of a
conflict arising, there must be an explanation, at least in general terms, of
the conflict of interest that is anticipated to arise and the implications.
Beyond that, a client cannot be asked to waive all future conflicts without
elaboration because not all are subject to waiver, or consent, under the
professional conduct rules. Therefore, even for a sophisticated class
representative, the pro forma waiver provision will not suffice.
Nor can individual clients be asked to contract in advance that they
will follow their lawyer’s direction about whether to settle. Settlement is
carved out by the Model Rules as a decision that “must . . . be made by the
client.”157 One might say that clients are actually making the decision if they
voluntarily decide in advance to follow the lawyer’s advice. But that seems
to violate the clear purpose of the rule, which is to preserve individual client
autonomy, informed but not controlled by legal counsel, over the
See Class Action Engagement Agreement, ECF No. 161-26, Gazzara v. Pulte Home
Corp., No. 6:16-cv-00657 (M.D. Fla.) (“[T]he Attorneys will be separately providing legal
representation to you at the same time that they will be providing legal representation to
other owners of homes, townhomes and condominiums against the builder of your
residence . . . . [Y]ou and other owners have each agreed to waive any conflict of interest
arising out of, and that you will not object to, our representation of each other in the matter
described herein.”).
153

154 See Letter from Frank E. Marchetti to Christine Anderson, ECF No. 16-1, Anderson v.
PODS of Los Angeles, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-04893 (C.D. Cal.) (“You understand that Attorney will
not be able to represent you if Attorney’s representation of you would create a conflict
with one of the Attorney’s existing clients . . . . You expressly agree to immediately consent
to Attorney substituting out as your attorney of record after a lawsuit is filed if Attorney
learns through discovery of such a conflict.”).
155

Rule 1.0(e), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

156 See, e.g., Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359-60
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding waiver language too vague).
157 Rule 1.2(a) comment 1, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (discussing Model
Rule 1.2(a)).
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“objectives” of the representation.158 We therefore think that it is unethical
for putative class counsel to ask their individual clients to agree to delegate
the settlement decision, whether in an initial retainer agreement or later
on.
The concerns we raise, and disclosures we suggest, may be less
relevant when the individual client is a sophisticated one—whether a
natural person or an entity—and when the client has other representation,
whether in-house lawyer employees or outside representation. After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the individual client of class
counsel is very likely to be a sophisticated institutional investor with inhouse counsel,159 and so securities litigation may well raise fewer concerns
than other types of class actions.
V.

WHAT SHOULD RULEMAKERS AND TRIAL COURTS DO?

We have shown that a certain kind of conflict is endemic in class
actions and is not being addressed. If courts or other rulemakers were to
pay attention to the conflicts problem we have identified, a number of
questions would arise. There is the threshold question of whether new
rules, standards, or procedures are needed, or whether existing law simply
needs to be more vigorously or differently applied. If new guidance is
needed, there is the institutional choice question of who should formulate
and who should apply it. Relatedly we must ask what a new legal rule,
standard, or procedure should say.
As discussed, current law and practice do not appear to understand
the conflicts we identify to be serious ones, and thus have not offered
solutions. Some change over the status quo is warranted. In the previous
section we suggested that class counsel or putative class counsel who also
have an individual lawyer-client relationship should consider making
certain kinds of disclosures to the individual clients to address potential
conflicts, and consider seeking informed consent to waive actual or
potential conflicts. But the class also must be protected, and absent class
members cannot give consent or receive adequate counseling. Because of
their absentee status, and their typically low knowledge or investment in
the class litigation, district court judges oversee class counsel and, when
158

Rule 1.2(a).

159 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (mandating a rebuttable presumption that
the lead plaintiff appointed by the court in a securities class action will be the investor with
“the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class”).
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necessary, protect absent class members from potential overreaching or
exploitation. Simply making class counsel more aware of the conflicts we
identify is not sufficient.
Courts handling class actions are often reluctant to apply the ABA
Model Rules or state counterparts addressing conflicts if they think that
policies of Rule 23 or the practical imperative to keep moving litigation to a
resolution will be hampered thereby. One might ask whether the conflicts
we identify could be appropriately addressed if federal courts were willing
to simply apply Model Rule 1.7 or other conflict rules as written to the
representation of classes.160 (In the previous section we advocated greater
compliance with the Model Rules approach by class counsel when
interacting with their individual clients.)
It is not as easy to dismiss the idea that the standard conflict rules
should govern the propriety of a lawyer’s joint representation of a class and
a class representative, just as they would govern the joint representation of
a corporation and a corporate officer. There would be nothing exceptional
about applying Rule 1.7 in this context, other than that the court’s
authorization would have to substitute for the class’s informed consent.161
If some other standard should apply, the reason is simply that class
counsel’s conflict is different from the conflicts that Rule 1.7 ordinarily
addresses and that courts, in overseeing class actions, are in a position to
develop and enforce a standard that makes better sense in this context.
On the other hand, conflict rules are written to cover situations
where there are no courts to oversee the lawyers, and may therefore tend
to be more protective and more categorical than courts need to be in class
action litigation, in which there is substantial judicial oversight.162 The
district courts serve as the gatekeeper of four things that plaintiff-side class
action lawyers greatly desire: class certification, appointment as class
counsel, approval of settlements, and approval of fees.163 District courts
therefore inherently have the attention of class action lawyers, and have
well-defined points during the litigation in which they interact with and can
monitor lawyers.
See generally Kane, supra note 12, at 389-90 (advocating for more effective judicial
oversight to address the possibility that class counsel may favor the class representatives’
interests).
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See Miller, supra note 11, at 588 (“review by the court substitutes for consent”).
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See, e.g., Green, supra note 24, at 127.
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See Rule 23(c)(1)(A), (e)(2), (g), (h).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by courts,
already require class counsel to provide information to the court about
conflicts as relevant to certification or settlement decisions, and judicial
doctrine further requires that even “potential” conflicts be brought to the
court’s attention.164 With this robust structure in place for judicial
oversight, overly protective and categorical ethics rules written to be
applied by lawyers themselves are arguably inappropriate.165
If the current Model Rules approach is not the best fit, the question
is then who might craft a better approach, and what that approach would
be. On the question of institutional choice, one possibility would be for the
ABA to develop a Model Rule that addresses conflicts in class actions
specifically, including the type on which we have focused. Another
possibility would be for the Rules Enabling Act process to be used to amend
Rule 23. The federal rulemaking process is likely to involve greater
participation by different constituencies166 than would be the case with an
ABA-controlled process. Moreover, some commentators worry that the
ABA’s output might tend to be “lowest common denominator” because of
the need to reach agreement from the ABA House of Delegates and other
factors.167 Whether or not that is true, there is reason to fear that a new
ABA rule would not have as much effect as reform at the federal law. As
noted above, many federal courts of appeals have expressly stated that they
feel free to depart from ordinary conflicts principles found in the Model
Rules when necessary to successfully manage class actions. Outside the
164

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

See Green supra note 24, at 126-28; Jonathan R. Macey, & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 97 (1997). Some commentators would
apply, or give considerable weight, to the conflict rules. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 13, at
965 (“Nothing in Federal Rule 23 exempts counsel from the ethical rules, and the rules’
applicability to all practicing attorneys does not take a holiday when an attorney chooses
to represent a class rather than an individual.”); Stuhan & Costello, supra note 11, at 1206
(“[I]t would be a mistake to jettison ethical considerations in the class certification
decision-making process altogether. The rules, while not necessarily controlling, should
inform the analysis.”).
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166 See generally Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM.
U.L. REV. 1655 (1995).

WOLFRAM, supra note 15, § 2.6.1 at 49; see also id. (“Once a number of lawyers defy a
code rule (or are believed by other lawyers to have taken a negative stance), the rule will
be widely ignored because of competitive pressures and a sense of unfairness. In that view
of professional sociology, the area left for regulation is a relatively narrow range that falls
between marginally enforceable rules and insubstantial ones.”).
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class action context, federal courts exercise supervisory authority (e.g., in
ruling on disqualification motions) in common-law fashion to develop and
apply their own legal standards governing attorney conflicts.168 That is,
federal courts sometimes deny disqualification even when the lawyer has
an impermissible conflict under the rules, because the court recognizes that
there are interests at stake for which the rules do not adequately account.
Likewise, courts sometimes disqualify lawyers on account of conflicts of
interest even when professional conduct rules would permit the
representation.169 The federal courts seem unlikely to relinquish this
independent, case-by-case approach even if the ABA wrote a new rule
tailored to class action conflicts.
It would be helpful, we think, for Rule 23 to be amended to make
explicit that conflicts of interest should receive the sustained attention of
courts overseeing class actions. We see no good reason why Rule
23(g)(1)(A) should not expressly mention conflicts.
Unfortunately, it may be too much to expect that an amendment to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be generated to address the
conflicts explored in this article. Observers of the last attempts by the
Advisory Committee to amend Rule 23 have noted that only relatively
uncontroversial and insignificant changes have been approved.170 The
Supreme Court seems to value its ability to effectively write and rewrite
rules of civil procedure via adjudication, and to be less interested in using
the much more cumbersome rule-making process. Muddling through by
lower federal courts, with a slight possibility of clarification by the Supreme
Court, may be the best that can reasonably be hoped for.
What should this muddling look like? There are a range of relevant
considerations. First, there are considerations of fairness to the individual
clients who might be required to forgo their chosen lawyers, with whom
they have a sustained relationship. This is a situation for which the
individuals are not to blame, and that is essentially unavoidable and
intrinsic to class action procedure. Under the present law, the named
plaintiff remains an individual client at least until the class is certified,
which, in the case of pre-certification settlements, is virtually the end of the
case. It may seem unfair to require individual clients to give up their
168

See Green, supra note 24, at 77-78, 120-22.
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See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).

170 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution
Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1514-16 (2017).
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lawyers at a midpoint or late point in the lawsuit. This sometimes occurs
in a joint representation when a conflict of interest unexpectedly emerges,
but clients in that situation have a choice whether to be jointly represented
and assume the risk that a conflict will later require the lawyer to withdraw.
And this problem cannot be solved at no cost by appointing a different
lawyer to serve as class counsel. It would not be in the class’s best interest
to be assigned a different lawyer who has no client in the matter and
therefore no prior familiarity or relationship with either the matter or the
class representatives.
Another consideration is whether disapproving of the joint
representation would avert the problems that it poses. Would class
counsel, who would now be a class representative’s former lawyer, favor
the class representative to a lesser extent, or would the lawyer’s
withdrawal from the individual representation be essentially meaningless?
Representing the class alone would solve some problems: the lawyer would
have no authority to negotiate a deal for the class representative
individually and no obligation as a matter of loyalty to encourage the class
representative to object to a settlement or to pursue separate
compensation. But the literature suggests that class counsel sometimes
favor the class representatives, with whom they have personal dealings,
over absent class members. In that event, formally terminating the
representation in the class action alone is unlikely to diminish the lawyer’s
loyalty to the class representative.
Yet another question is the frequency with which nascent conflicts
become manifest. That is an empirical question on which there appears to
be no research. But courts may make assumptions based on their own
experience, interactions and study. If courts have not seen the problem
arise very often in their own and their colleagues’ courtrooms, it is easy to
be dismissive.
Courts might also take account of the extent to which a conflict, if it
becomes manifest, is likely to be harmful. One’s assessment of harm turns,
in part, on one’s understanding of the class’s interests. If one thinks that
absent class members do not have a significant reliance interest at the precertification stage, then one will not be too troubled by the prospect that
the class representative will sell out the nascent class with the lawyer’s
assistance by leveraging the class action to achieve a favorable personal
settlement. This assessment also depends on courts’ confidence in their
ability to prevent or avert harm to the class by overseeing the class action.
If judges believe that they can discern when a lawyer disserved the class
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because of a conflict of interest, and believe they have the resources to
redress the problem, then there may be little reason to be proactive or
restrictive.
And, of course, courts will take account of the administrability and
burdensomeness of any alternative to doing nothing until a problem
screams out. Courts almost always place weight on the interest in judicial
economy.171 Almost any alternative will be more costly than the status quo.
Certainly, implementing the conflict rules at the pre-certification or
certification stage of a class action will impose a cost on the court, which, as
a proxy for the class, would presumably have to hold a hearing and make a
ruling on the permissibility of the joint representation. Ordinarily, conflict
rules are implemented by the lawyers alone, and therefore courts may be
unconcerned about whatever burdens they impose.
While this discussion identifies various unresolved questions, one
can understand why trial judges would be inclined to view class counsel’s
representation of class representatives as a Rule 23 problem to be managed
in a contextual, case-by-case manner, not a Rule 1.7 question to be given a
more categorical answer. The problem is distinctive in various respects and
implicates considerations of class action policy and judicial policy
generally. The one-size-fits-all conflict rules may not be best suited to this
situation.
One can also understand why courts might tacitly adopt and apply a
Rule 23 standard that calls for ignoring the joint representation until a
party raises it as a problem. While courts do not appear to have undertaken
any explicit analysis, they may tacitly conclude that: it would be unfair to
the individual clients to deprive them of their lawyers and disadvantageous
to the class to appoint a different lawyer; in most cases, the joint
representation will not result in manifest conflict that creates significant
harm that could be averted by forbidding or terminating the joint
representation; and anyway, the problem is not worth the courts’ time.
Further, the lawyers involved in class actions have little incentive to
disabuse courts of this assumption. In general, no one benefits from a
stricter or more labor-intensive approach, since many who vie to be
selected as class counsel are likely to have an individual client.
Given the legal framework established by Rule 23, this is a
Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982) (stating that “efficiency
and economy” are “a principal purpose” of the class action).
171
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reasonable approach. It is not feasible for courts to require lawyers for the
nascent class to withdraw from representing individual class members, and
at the time of class certification, the risks to the class created by the joint
representation do not loom large enough to justify requiring class
representatives to relinquish the lawyers who represented them prior to
filing the class action lawsuit.
Less reasonable is courts failure to acknowledge the problem
described in this Article and to develop a jurisprudence that offers guidance
to plaintiffs’ lawyers in class actions about how to reconcile the ethical and
fiduciary duties they owe to a class or nascent class with those they owe to
an individual class member at various stages of a class action, including in
the context of the holdout, sellout and payout scenarios described in Part II.
If the Model Rules are inapplicable or subject to implicit override by the
policies of Rule 23, then lawyers need guidance from elsewhere, and courts,
which have a supervisory responsibility over class actions and over the bar
generally, are the obvious place to look.
Among the questions that courts should resolve are, first, what
duties does the lawyer owe prior to class certification to the nascent class
or to absent class members and when they arise. Without knowing the
scope of the representation, the lawyer cannot know whether serving the
interest of the putative class representative at the expense of the nascent
class constitutes a fiduciary breach and a conflict of interest or doing so is
entirely legitimate. Second, based on the resolution of this question, courts
should set forth their expectations when there is a significant risk that the
lawyer’s duties to the class, or nascent class, will be compromised.
Presumably, the Model Rules address the risk to the class representative
and, in any event, that is not the court’s principal concern under Rule 23.
But courts are supposed to develop standards and procedures to address
when class counsel is compromising or jeopardizing the class’s interests.
Courts should whether and when lawyers should raise this problem with
the trial court, as they would other conflicts of interest, and, if not, how
lawyers should resolve the problem on their own.
Whether courts should seek assurances from plaintiffs’ lawyers at
the outset of a class action lawsuit that they have reached an appropriate
understanding with their individual clients is a harder question. In the
absence of an appropriate understanding, class counsel may be under even
greater pressure than otherwise to serve the individual client’s interests at
the expense of the class. If lawyers acknowledge and explain to their
individual clients the limits of their loyalty to the client and the scenarios
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that may require the lawyer to withdraw, lawyers will find it easier to
comply with these expectations. If so, trial courts’ responsibility to protect
the class may call for some kind of inquiry.
We recommend that, in any class action except those led by
sophisticated entity plaintiffs, such as many securities class actions
governed by the PSLRA, district courts should inquire at the outset whether
class counsel is also representing any class members as individuals and, if
so, should require counsel to file with the court any retainer agreements or
other documents setting forth the scope and basis of the attorney-client
arrangement. If counsel had oral conversations with individual clients
about potential conflicts, the court should require that these be reduced to
writing. Any documents containing attorney-client privileged information
or opinion work product could be filed in camera for judicial review only.
District courts should also remind counsel of their continuing obligation to
bring potential or actual conflicts that develop later to the courts’ attention.
Once courts set forth clear expectations, however, there may be no
need for oversight other than in the relatively infrequent cases in which
problems will be called to their attention. Moreover, it would be
burdensome on courts to question class representatives and their lawyers
to ensure that their have reached an understanding that will adequately
protect not only the individual client but the class or nascent class. Our
point, therefore, is not that courts must go to lengths to police lawyers’
compliance with judicial expectations, it is simply that courts have been
remiss in failing to elaborate on their expectations in the first place
CONCLUSION
For decades, courts and commentators have been well aware that
“[i]nherent in any class action is the potential for conflicting interests
among the class representatives, class counsel, and absent class
members.”172 Notwithstanding this realization and a substantial amount of
scholarly and judicial commentary on class action conflicts, we believe that
one kind of conflict has not received due attention: the conflict that
inevitably arises when class counsel also represents individual class
members as individuals. We have shown that this kind of conflict arises
from the very beginning of a putative class representation, and predictably
172 Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1995).
Accord Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“[C]onflicts of interest are built into the device of the class action.”).
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will put the lawyer for the class and the individual in fraught positions with
regard to the conflicting interests of the class and the individual. The more
radical possible solutions—for instance, banning concurrent
representation of a class and an individual class member on an individual
basis—call to mind the medical adage about avoiding cures that are worse
than the disease. We have therefore recommended more measured
responses, primarily (1) greater disclosure of risks to individual clients by
their attorneys, and (2) greater judicial oversight.
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